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1. Introduction 
Over the past decades, the structure of banking systems has changed dramatically as banks have 
diversified branches across different geographic markets, resulting in interbank engagement. 
For example, Citibank, Standard Charter, and HSBC have eight overlapped markets in 
Americas, fifteen overlapped markets in Asia, seven overlapped markets in Europe as well as 
seven overlapped markets in Middle East and Africa. Banks can also experience repeated 
competition in local markets within a country like the case of Barclays, Lloyds, and Royal Bank 
of Scotland in the UK. On the one hand, banks’ geographic diversification could improve 
performance. On the other hand, it raises the question as to what extent multimarket competition 
can affect banks’ competitive behavior and thus profitability. 
Research on multimarket competition can be divided into two main strands. The first view, 
mutual forbearance hypothesis, suggests that the high degree of multimarket contacts might 
have anti-competitive effect on firms’ strategy (e.g., Edwards, 1955; Feinberg, 1984; Sorenson, 
2007). It is the case when vigorous competitive attitude of a firm in one market might lead to 
simultaneous attacks from its multimarket rivals in all other markets. Thus, multimarket firms 
have incentives to cooperate for a reciprocal exchange of favor. In contrast, the second view 
suggests the pro-competitive effect of multimarket contacts. Solomon (1972) argues that if 
banks already compete aggressively in given markets in one region, higher level of multimarket 
linkages within that region might enhance the intensity of competition and reduce bank 
profitability. Similarly, multimarket contacts, coupled by imperfect information, might have 
pro-competitive effect if firms compete in quantities (Mester, 1992). Although these theories 
have been empirically explored (e.g., Degl’Innocenti et al., 2014; Li and Greenwood, 2004), 
evidence in banking is scarce and inconclusive. One of the key problems is a lack of detailed 
and rich data on banks’ branch location.1 This leads to (i) problems with measuring competition 
at local levels and (ii) difficulty in examining the channels through which repeated competition 
affects competitive strategies and performance. 
Our paper provides new evidence of the relationship between multimarket competition and 
bank profitability using data of Ukrainian banking sector over the 2009-2015 period. This 
banking sector presents a well-suited case for our research exploration due to two main reasons. 
Firstly, existing studies document the effect of bank branch expansion following the 
deregulation on branch opening in the US and Italy. This is different from the situation in 
Ukraine where both network growth and network reduction are witnessed. From 2009 to late 
2013, 1,809 new bank branches were opened while the number of branches decreased by 
16.14% during the 2014-2015 period. Secondly, the network reduction in the Ukraine is unique 
in the sense that it is caused by an exogenous shock. More specifically, following the 
geopolitical conflict between Ukraine and Russia in 2014, all Ukrainian credit institutions 
completely withdrew from Crimea, along with the closure of some (or most) of their branches 
in the self-proclaimed regions in Eastern Ukraine. For example, the number of banks operating 
                                                 
1 To the best of our knowledge, only two data sets are available for research including data on the US banking 
(e.g., Pilloff, 1999; Whalen, 1996) and the Italian banking (e.g., Coccorese and Pellecchia, 2009; De Bonis and 
Ferrando, 2000). 
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in these regions dropped from 122 in 2014Q1 to 80 as of 2015Q4, accounting for only 54% of 
existing banks. Thus, we could use the variation in multimarket banks’ exposure to the conflict 
to sharpen our identification. 
In the first part of our analysis, we test the effects of multimarket competition on the 
performance of Ukrainian banks. Our results show a positive and significant relationship 
between repeated competition and profitability. However, this link is observed only when 
banks’ market shares are relatively similar or banks have a high degree of familiarity. In 
contrast, powerful banks do not have incentives to mutual forbear with their weaker 
multimarket counterparts. Further analysis shows that the anti-competitive effect of 
multimarket competition is facilitated by a high level of competitiveness in the markets. Our 
results are robust to the use of alternative measures of multimarket competition and different 
sets of samples. In the second set of tests, we examine the multimarket competition–profitability 
relationship in the presence of the exogenous shock. This approach provides an insight into the 
competitive attitudes of banks that have responded to the changes in the markets. As a result of 
the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, more affected banks have closed many of their 
branches, leading to the significant changes in banks’ market shares and the lowered 
competitiveness of the markets. Consequently, after the conflict, less affected banks do not have 
incentives to cooperate with more affected ones. 
Our findings have several implications for the reform of banking sectors in Ukraine and other 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries as they share similar institutional setup and legal 
frameworks. First, the Central Bank could promote the consolidation of small and medium 
banks. Thus, consolidated banks can improve their competitive positions and gain benefits from 
anti-competitive effect of multimarket contacts. Second, given the importance of the familiarity 
in shaping competitive strategies, the new and undiversified banks could consider branch 
network expansion. Hence, they can attract new customers as well as increase the familiarity 
with the multimarket competitors.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature on 
multimarket competition. Section 3 provides the overview about the Ukrainian banking system. 
Section 4 illustrates our empirical strategy and data description. Section 5 presents empirical 
results and discussion. Section 6 concludes and provides the policy implications. 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Mutual forbearance hypothesis  
One of the earliest phenomenon, referred to as linked oligopoly theory or mutual forbearance 
hypothesis, is proposed by Edwards (1955). It suggests that multimarket firms may not have 
aggressive attitudes toward their multimarket competitors due to the risk of multipoint attacks 
from the rivals. More specifically, if a firm has aggressively competitive action in one market, 
the interdependence might provoke simultaneous attacks in all markets where that firm meets 
its rivals. In contrast, firms might have incentives to cooperate with multimarket competitors in 
the hope of a reciprocal exchange of favors. Other theoretical studies provide support for this 
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argument by employing game theory models (e.g., Feinberg, 1984; Hughes and Oughton, 1993) 
or infinitely repeated game with discounting (Matsushima, 2001). Furthermore, Sorenson 
(2007) argues that the intensity of collusion is facilitated by the reciprocal recognition of 
multipoint contacts rather than by market differences or other factors. 
Several studies suggest that the mutual forbearance incentive is induced by the familiarity 
which is a firm’s awareness about its rivals’ competitive strategies, capabilities or actions (e.g., 
Baum and Korn 1999; Jayachandran et al., 1999). In the multimarket setup, a higher level of 
multimarket contacts allows banks to collect more information about their rivals. Thus, firms’ 
competitive strategies are constrained by the potential multipoint attacks from rivals. The 
mutual forbearance can also be induced by the deterrence that is enhanced by spheres of 
influence (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990; Edwards, 1955).2 In case firms compete in multiple 
markets and firms have different market positions in different markets, multimarket firms might 
have tacit arrangements. As a result, firms could benefit from the markets which they dominate 
and prevent the multimarket rivals from vigorously competitive attitudes in those markets at 
the same time. 
The mutual forbearance hypothesis has been empirically tested in different aspects. A large 
body of literature focuses on the relationship between multimarket contacts and the level of 
competition. For instance, using high price as a signal of less rivalry, Evans and Kessides (1994) 
provide evidence for linked oligopoly in airline industry. That is, airlines with more multipoint 
contacts avoid aggressively low prices because they fear that their rivals might act in the same 
way in other routes. Similarly, Baum and Korn (1996) find that airlines choose to enter in low-
density routes and exit from high-density routes to sustain themselves from their rivals. 
However, the enter/exit rates are lowered with the increases in multimarket contacts, especially 
in markets dominated by a single airline. 
Other studies examine the effects of multimarket contacts with respect to firms’ profitability. 
Scott (1991) provides evidence for the linked oligopoly theory by exploring a sample of 64 US 
firms in 35 industries. Further analysis shows that the impact of diversified concentration on 
profits is enhanced in industries with a high level of multimarket linkages among sellers. 
Conducting a study in the UK manufacturing sector, Hughes and Oughton (1993) state that 
multimarket contacts are positively related to the rate of return on capital and price-cost 
margins. The positive association between multimarket contacts and yields of profits has been 
also found in the airline industry (e.g., Gimeno and Woo, 1996; Signal, 1996) or Canadian 
insurance sector (Li and Chuang, 2001). Li and Greenwood (2004) find evidence for the mutual 
forbearance hypothesis under specified conditions. That is, multimarket firms can only improve 
their performance through multiple market interactions if they are similar in size. Whalen 
(1996) studies interstate bank holding companies in the US and finds that the higher level of 
multimarket linkages, in conjunction with high concentration, is related to higher profitability. 
Pilloff (1999) finds similar results: a higher level of outside MMC would reduce competition 
in a reference market and increase the profitability of a focal bank. More recently, Coccorese 
                                                 
2 Deterrence is a firm’s ability to prevent the rivals from aggressive actions that cause financial damage to the firm. 
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and Pellecchia (2009) analyse a sample of 655 Italian banks over a four-year period and 
document that banks that heavily exposed to outside contacts are more likely to mutual forbear 
with the multimarket rivals in a reference market. 
2.2. Alternative views about multimarket competition 
The alternative view suggests a pro-competitive effect of multiple market contacts. Solomon 
(1972) proposes that strong multimarket linkages within a region might lead to more 
competition if banks have already competed aggressively in local markets in that region.  Using 
the perpetual signaling model, Mester (1992) finds that geographic overlaps promote higher 
competition if firms compete in quantities, regardless of imperfect information and finite 
horizon. When a firm competes with competitors through the quantity of output, it may initially 
produce more than its actual single-period profit-maximizing quantity. This may mislead the 
competitors that the firm is a low-cost one and the competitors would put a lower quantity of 
products on the market in the following periods. As a result, the firm can benefit from its 
quantity advantage against its rivals. When the rival firms choose a similar strategy, the level 
of competition in the market will increase. 
The negative relationship between multimarket contacts and competition has been empirically 
supported by a number of studies. For example, Sandler (1988) illustrates that more multiple 
market contacts with major rivals have increased the degree of market rivalry in the US airline 
industry. The pro-competitive behavior of multimarket contacts is also found in the mobile 
phone industry (Parker and Roller, 1997). Further, no evidence of the linked oligopoly theory 
is found in the leasing industry (Degl’Innocenti et al., 2014) or in the loan market (Alexander, 
1985). Alexander (1985) finds that banks with high levels of multiple market contacts have 
higher interest rates and fees as well as lower returns on assets. Mester (1987) finds similar 
results by considering two multimarket contact measures based on the distribution of multiple 
market linkage probability. Moreover, documenting the cross product between multimarket 
contacts and market concentration, the interaction is found to be more important than the 
individual effects. Rhoades and Heggestad (1985) only find partial support for the mutual 
forbearance nexus: multipoint contacts adversely affect the profitability in the markets where 
the large firms have a large number of outside contacts. With reference to Italian banking sector 
in the 1990s, De Bonis and Ferrando (2000) observe that the higher level of multimarket 
linkages might promote competition and lower lending rates. 
Some other studies propose a U-shaped relationship between multimarket linkages and rivalry. 
Analyzing the competitive interaction between pairs of rival airlines, Baum and Korn (1999) 
show that at the beginning, multimarket contacts induce relatively competitive advantage for 
airlines. This advantage declines with the increases in pairwise multimarket contacts: when the 
number of multimarket rivals increases, the airlines have incentives to compete vigorously. 
Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2006) also find the inverted U-shaped relationship in Spanish banking 
market: deregulation provides incentives for banks with a low level of multimarket contacts to 
enter the new markets. In contrast, it reduces the entry rates of banks that already have a high 
level of multiple contacts due to the familiarity effect and the retaliatory threat. 
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Recent studies on multiple market contacts have been drawn in a new perspective that considers 
the effects of competition from multimarket firms on performance of small, single-market 
firms. Hannan and Prager (2004) analyse the pricing behavior of single-market banks in the 
presence of multimarket banks and find that it is driven by local market concentration regardless 
of multimarket banks. However, this influence is weakened by the growth of multimarket 
banks’ market shares. Further, competition from multimarket banks reduces the deposit interest 
rates offered by single-market banks in the same market, resulting in lower profits. Berger et 
al. (2007) support this view when they test both efficiency hypothesis and hubris hypothesis in 
the US banking market from 1982 to 2000. They find that in the 1990s, multimarket banks 
enjoyed a competitive advantage over single-market banks due to their geographic expansion. 
Consequently, single-market banks experienced a decline in revenues and an increase in costs. 
Hannan and Prager (2009) examine the extent to which the presence of multimarket banks 
influences single-market banks’ profitability. Dividing the sample by rural and urban markets, 
they find that the presence of multimarket banks only diminishes profitability of the single-
market banks in the rural markets. This decline is sharper in higher concentration markets while 
it is smaller with the size of single-market banks.  
Empirical studies about multimarket competition–bank profitability relationship face several 
challenges, leaving some gaps in the literature. The first challenge is about data requirement. 
To measure multimarket competition, the detailed data about branch address of each bank are 
required. However, to the best of our knowledge, most of the existing data is about the US 
banking, resulting in limited studies outside the US context. The second challenge arises from 
the methodological difficulties. The relationship between banks’ competitive behavior and 
performance might be mediated by other unobserved bank characteristics. Therefore, regressing 
profitability on multimarket competition in the absence of experimental experience might fail 
to identify the causal relationship. Recent studies have not yet addressed this problem. We aim 
to fulfill those gaps in several ways. First, a rich and detailed dataset of branch location allows 
us to define multimarket competition at different geographical levels. Second, using the 
political conflict between Ukraine and Russia as a negative shock to the banking sector, we can 
control for the identification problem relating to the MMC-performance relationship. 
3. Ukrainian banking sector 
The establishment of the modern Ukrainian banking sector started in 1991, following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the adoption of the Law “On Banks and Banking”. This 
banking sector has a two-level structure. The first level is the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) 
which serves as the central bank and bank regulator. The second level includes commercial 
banks, mostly domestic banks with private ownership. As of 2015Q4, of the 113 banks holding 
licenses, there were 41 banks with foreign capital with only 17 banks had 100% foreign 
ownership. Figure 1 shows the distribution of all Ukrainian banks and branches across 26 
regions in different periods. Even though Ukrainian banks have been diversifying their branches 
across all regions, the distribution is asymmetric: banks tend to cluster in some major markets 
including the Kiev region, Kiev city, regions of Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia 
and Odessa. 
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<<Insert Fig 1 about here>> 
The development of the Ukrainian banking sector after the 2007-2008 financial crisis can be 
divided into three phases. A recovery time (late 2009 to late 2012) was followed by an 
expansion period (late 2012 to early 2014) and a political crisis (early 2014 until now). During 
the recovery and expansion periods, loan growth increased from 1.03% by 2010Q4 to 11.78% 
by 2013Q4 (National Bank of Ukraine, 2016). Over this period, asset growth and deposit 
growth also witnessed the increases of 6.37% and 8.19%, respectively (Panel A, Fig 1). 
Correspondingly, Ukrainian banks steadily expanded their activities and branches all over the 
country leading to a significant increase in the number of branches over this period (Panel B, 
Fig 1). Since 2014, the deep recession of the economy, coupled with the Russian annexation of 
Crimea and the armed confrontation in two Eastern regions (Donetsk and Luhansk), have had 
negative effects on the banking sector. As of 2015Q4, the banking sector lost about 4% of assets 
and loans along with 1.55% decrease in deposits. Following Regulation No. 260 issued by the 
National Bank of Ukraine in 2014, all Ukrainian credit institutions completely suspended their 
operation in Crimea and withdrew from this peninsula. Further, some banks also announced the 
closure of some (or most) of their branches in the self-proclaimed regions. This has resulted in 
a steep reduction in the number of banks and branches - especially in the occupied regions and 
their neighboring regions. 
In comparison with banking systems in other Eastern European countries, the Ukrainian 
banking sector has heterogeneity since it has a large number of banks and is mixed between 
small and big banks. Interestingly, the extent to which banks diversify their branch networks 
does not necessarily depend on size. For example, some single-market banks (e.g., ING Bank) 
belong to Group 2, group of the second-largest banks, while some geographically diversified 
banks (e.g., Accent Bank, Omega Bank) are classified into Group 4, group of the smallest 
banks. Differently, other Eastern European banking sectors do not have such large size. For 
example, as of 2015Q1, there were 46 banks in Czech Republic (Czech National Bank, 2016) 
and 28 banks in Slovakia (National Bank of Slovakia, 2016), about one third of the Ukrainian 
banking size. The Polish and Hungarian banking sectors have similar size with Ukrainian 
banking with about 605 banks (The Polish Bank Association, 2016) and 126 banks (The Banks, 
2016), respectively. However, their systems are not well diversified compared to the Ukrainian 
banking: about a half of banks in Hungary is mortgage and savings banks while local operative 
banks dominate the Polish banking sector. 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1. The econometric model 
 Baseline specification 
To investigate the relationship between repeated competition and bank profitability, we first 
estimate model (1) using fixed-effect estimator. Next, using difference-in-differences approach 
(model (2)), we develop an identification of a causal effect of multimarket competition on bank 
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performance in the presence of the exogenous shock. Finally, we check the robustness of our 
results by using different sets of samples and a variety of weighting strategy in the analysis. 
Multimarket competition and profitability 
To test the role of multimarket competition on bank performance, we estimate the following 
equations: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1𝛿 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1)  
where i is the index of banks, t is the index of time. The dependent variable is return on assets 
(ROA). We measure the degree of multimarket competition by multimarket contacts. Since the 
performance of banks could be affected by bank-specific characteristics, we also consider a 
vector of bank-level variables including: (i) bank size measured by natural logarithm of the 
bank’s assets (Size), (ii) the ratio of liquid assets to total assets (Liquidity), (iii) the equity ratio 
(Equity), (iv) the deposit ratio (Deposits/Total assets), and (v) the loans-to-assets ratio 
(Loans/Total assets).3 Additionally, a vector of time fixed effects (𝑣𝑡) and bank fixed effects 
(𝑢𝑖) are also included into the specification.
4 Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Appendix 1 contains 
the detailed definitions of all variables. 
Bank size has been widely used as a determinant of profitability. However, studies into this 
relationship provide ambiguous results. According to economies of scale, bank size tends to 
have a positive impact on banks’ profits. Because larger banks are more likely to save more 
operating costs, they are more efficient (e.g., Pasiouras and Hosmidou, 2007). However, banks 
might experience dis-economies of scale due to a possible trade-off between bank growth and 
profitability. Hence, bank size may have negative impact on profits (e.g., Baumol, 1959). 
Further, Eichengreen and Gibson (2001) suggest a U-shaped size-profitability relationship: 
small banks can benefit from economies of scale when they grow in size while profits of large 
banks are lower because they no longer benefit from economies of scale along with higher costs. 
According to the conventional risk-return theory, banks that hold more liquid assets and have a 
higher capital-to-assets ratio are safer but less profitable compared to riskier banks (e.g., Berger, 
1995). However, some studies suggest that banks with higher liquidity and equity ratios are 
indeed less likely to go bankrupt even they experience a short period of difficult time (e.g., 
Berger, 1995). Additionally, a higher level of capitalization helps banks avoid the cost premium 
of external funding, which in return could have a positive effect on its profitability (e.g., Bourke, 
1989; Molyneux and Thornton, 1992; Molyneux and Forbes, 1995; Garcia-Herrero et al., 2009). 
Loans and deposits are the two main sources of banks’ profits. On the one hand, more loans 
and deposits generate more profits. On the other hand, loans and deposits may have negative 
impact on profitability because of potential losses. If loans are composed mostly of high-risk 
                                                 
3 We also experience with different sets of control variables such as adding the ratio of non-interest income to total 
operating income and/or cost to income ratio. The results are quantitatively similar. 
4 Bank fixed-effects also include ownership effects as banks did not report changes in type of ownership (state 
owned, private, and foreign) during the observation period. 
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loans, more loans are associated with higher potential losses (e.g., Miller and Noulas, 1997). In 
addition, the extent that increases in deposits contribute to profits depends on the banks’ ability 
to convert deposits into income-earning assets. If the deposit is converted into low credit assets 
such as high-risk loans, more deposits could mitigate bank profitability (e.g., Dietrich and 
Wanzenried, 2011). 
We estimate model (1) using the fixed-effects estimator to control for time-invariant and bank-
specific heterogeneity and measure multimarket competition at both the regional and the city 
levels. In terms of competition at city level, we first define the center city of each region as a 
market. Alternatively, we also consider cities having at least 30 and 50 bank branches as our 
second and third definitions of a market at the city level, respectively.5 Urban villages, villages 
and settlements are excluded from our sample. The competition is measured with the samples 
of all regions and unoccupied regions. To avoid causal ambiguity, we use one-quarter lag of all 
independent variables. 
Identification strategy using quasi-experimental design 
To identify banks’ competitive strategies towards multimarket rivals deeper, we employ the 
geopolitical conflict between Ukraine and Russia that seriously affected the occupied regions 
and regions with pro-Russian protests.6 Since this conflict is unexpected, banks could not adjust 
the number of branches in these regions in anticipation of the shock. In fact, there are banks 
that kept high presence or even expanded their branch networks in the affected regions just 
before the conflict happened (e.g., Sberbank or Bank Forward). However, after escalation of 
unrest in 2014, the number of branches in these regions significantly declined. For example, 
Akta Bank, of which about 78% of branches were located in the affected regions before the 
conflict, revoked in 2014Q3. There are also banks (e.g., Artem Bank or Bank Alliance) which 
do not present or maintain the low presence in these regions in both pre- and post-conflict 
periods. Therefore, the unexpected exogenous shock has a variable effect on Ukrainian banks 
depending on location of their branches. Given this setup, we aim to investigate the causal 
relationship between bank profitability and multimarket competition that is possibly disrupted 
by the shock.7 
In our difference-in-differences setting, banks with larger branch shares in the affected regions 
in the pre-conflict period belong to the treatment group, while banks with fewer or no branches 
in affected regions constitute the control group. In contrast to the standard difference-in-
differences setup, our treatment variable is continuous.8 Our model is specified as follows:  
                                                 
5 Similar results are obtained when we test with cities with at least 10, 15 and 20 bank branches 
6 Regions with pro-Russian protests include Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa regions. 
7 Almeida et al. (2015) examine the efficiency of the internal capital market of different business groups using the 
1997 Asian financial crisis shock. Yang and Zhao (2014) study the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance using the Canadian – United States Free Trade Agreement of 1989 as a shock.  
8 For references of papers using continuous treatment, see Gilje et al. (2016), Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) or Yang 
and Zhao (2014). 
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𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝜑𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1𝛿 +
𝑢𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
where Share is the share of branches of bank i in the occupied regions and regions with pro-
Russian protests (affected regions) as of 2014Q1. Since this variable is time-invariant and we 
employ fixed-effect estimator, our treatment indicator is not included into the econometric 
specification (2).  Post is a dummy variable that takes value of 0 for the pre-conflict period and 
1 for the post-conflict period. We restrict our sample to eight quarters, four quarters before and 
four quarters after the conflict start date (2014Q1), to control for the delay of the impact. 
The parallel trend is the main assumption in this identification strategy. In the absence of the 
exogenous shock, we would observe no difference in performance - multimarket competition 
sensitivity for the treatment and control groups. Adopting similar approach with Autor (2003), 
we test this assumption by augmenting model (1) with the pre- and post- conflict effects of the 
treatment as follows. 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡2014𝑄1−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=−𝑚 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡−1𝛿 +
𝑣𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  (3)  
where Share equals the branch share in affected regions for all quarters before 2014Q1 and 
equals the share as of 2014Q1 for the post-conflict period.9 Pre-conflict and post-conflict effects 
of the treatment on the MMC-performance sensitivity are indicated by 
variable(s) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡2014𝑄1−𝑗. These binary variables indicate the conflict, 4 quarters before and 
after as well as quarter 5th backward and forward. We expect the coefficients 𝜃𝑗  on all variables 
indicating the treatment effect before the conflict equals zero. 
 Multimarket contact measures 
In the literature, multimarket contacts are measured based on either counting basis or 
probability basis. The counting method calculates contacts in four different levels: the dyad-in-
market level (e.g., Scott, 1982), the dyad level (e.g., Baum and Korn, 1999), the firm level (e.g., 
Gimeno and Woo, 1996), and the market level (e.g., Feinberg, 1985). The most common firm-
level measure accounts for the average number of contacts of a bank i in quarter t.  
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡𝑗≠𝑖
𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
Here, 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the number of markets in which bank i and its rival j operate simultaneously in 
quarter t, and 𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the number of banks that meet bank i in at least one market in quarter 
t. This non-weighting measure does not consider the difference in banks’ competitive attitudes 
towards different multimarket rivals. Following Coccorese and Pellecchia (2009), 
Degl’Innocenti et al. (2014), and Li and Greenwood (2004), we modify this measure and 
                                                 
9 Variable Share varies over time. However, the variation is low and it is in range between -0.1 and 0.1 for 94.77% 
observations in our sample. 
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compute three multimarket linkage measures to make use of different weighting factors as 
follows.10  
The first weighting factor considers the similarity of bank i and bank j (in terms of their market 
shares) in the markets they meet. The market share is the ratio of all branches of bank i in market 
k to total branches of all bank in market k in quarter t. We construct this measure due to two 
reasons. First, banks are more likely to give attention to similar sized competitors as they deal 
with the same regulations (e.g., capital requirement) and have identical products and customers. 
Second, competitive strategies of banks that have similar market shares might be affected by 
deterrence. 
𝑠𝑖𝑘,𝑡 =
𝑏𝑟a𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑘,𝑡
𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑘,𝑡
 
The similarity index between banks i and j, 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗, is the sum of the absolute differences of the 
market shares for all markets where they coincide. 
𝑆I𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ |𝑠𝑖𝑘,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑗𝑘,𝑡|
𝑘
 
The minimum value of SI index is 0 (when banks have the same market share in every market) 
and the maximum value of SI index is close to the number of markets in which banks coincide 
(when banks are very dissimilarity in terms of market shares). The smaller SI is more similar 
when two banks are in terms of market shares. Then SI is used to calculate the first weighting 
factor (𝑤𝑗,𝑡
1
𝑖
) that ranges between 0 and 1. 𝑤𝑗,𝑡
1
𝑖
 increases with the similarity. Essentially, this 
measure is the basic measure of multimarket contact weighted by 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑡, or we can consider it 
as the interaction between the basic measure and 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑡. 
𝑤𝑗,𝑡
1
𝑖
=
𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡
 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
1 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡𝑤𝑗,𝑡
1
𝑖𝑗≠𝑖
𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
The second weighting factor, 𝑤𝑗,𝑡
2
𝑖
, reflects the importance of the rival bank j based on the 
number of markets in which bank i meets bank j. The more markets they meet, the more familiar 
they are. This might affect the banks’ competitive strategy. In addition, banks would pay more 
attention to those rivals that coincide with them in more markets. Thus, 𝑤𝑗,𝑡
2
𝑖
 is calculated as: 
𝑤𝑗,𝑡
2
𝑖
=
𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
                                                 
10 Numeric example for multimarket contact measures is specified in Appendix 3.  
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where 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the total markets in which bank i operates at least one branch in quarter t. 
Then the second multimarket indicator, 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
2 , is defined as: 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
2 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡𝑤𝑗,𝑡
2
𝑖𝑗≠𝑖
𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
  
The third measure of weighting factor reflects the size (in terms of market share) of the rival j 
as follows: 
𝑤𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑖
=
∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑘,𝑡𝑘
𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡
 
This indicator ranges between 0 and 1, and increases with the size of the rival j. This measure 
indirectly indicates the competitive position of a bank versus its multimarket rivals. 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
3 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡𝑤𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑖𝑗≠𝑖
𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
4.2. Data and sample 
Our original sample contains 4,739 observations of 214 Ukrainian banks with financial data 
available from 2009Q1 to 2015Q4. After dropping those cases for which variables are missing 
or misleading, our final sample consists of 209 Ukrainian banks with 4,687 observations.11 Our 
panel is unbalanced and allows for both entry and exit. In terms of data about branch location, 
we exclude Crimea because of the following reason: after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 
March 2014, Ukrainian banks had withdrawn from this market completely. Thus, the available 
data about bank branches in Crimea, even the data in the pre-conflict period, is limited. Our 
cleaned branch dataset contains 34,434 observations with detailed information about the 
location as well as the open and close dates of all branches. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for all banks. Overall, the Ukrainian banking system 
experiences a poor performance with a negative average return. The average values of other 
bank-specific variables are relatively similar to those in other Eastern European emerging 
markets (see, e.g., Mirzaei et al., 2013). Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for samples of 
multimarket banks and single-market banks at the regional and center-city levels.1213 The 
average return on assets of single-market banks is positive while ROA of multimarket banks is 
negative. In other words, single-market banks seem to be more profitability than multimarket 
banks. Using the t-test for mean comparison between two groups, we find that the difference is 
                                                 
11 This is the number of banks in our sample. Due to the entry/exit of several banks, number of banks in each 
quarter may be less than 209. 
12 Multimarket banks are those operating in more than one market; single-market banks are those operating in only 
one market. 
13 At regional level, each Ukrainian region (except from Crimea) is defined as a market. At center-city level, each 
center city (as given by the National Bank of Ukraine) is defined as a market. 
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statistically significant. Further, the volatility of return on assets of multimarket banks is also 
higher than those of single-market banks. These signs hold when we compare the return 
difference between multimarket and single-market banks at the center city level. It is possible 
that multimarket banks are exposed to more risks versus single-market banks because they have 
lower liquidity ratios and lower equity ratios. However, multimarket banks experience higher 
deposit ratios and loan-to-assets ratios than single-market banks although these differences are 
weakened at the city level.   
<<Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here>> 
Panel B in Fig 2 displays the changes in the number of banks and branches over time. In the 
first two quarter of 2009, the Ukrainian banking sector experienced the peak in the number of 
banks with the presence of 207 banks in the market. In contrast, the number of banks dropped 
significantly in 2014Q4 to 148 banks. Although the number of banks fluctuates during 2009-
late 2014, the number of branches gradually increased over that period. After 2014Q1, there 
was a sharp downward trend in the number of banks and branches. Regarding the changes in 
the average multimarket contacts (Panel C, Fig 2), multimarket contacts measures weighted by 
the similarity and the ratio of coincided markets increased steadily from 2009 to the third 
quarter of 2012, fluctuated during the 2013-late 2014 period, and dropped dramatically 
afterwards. This evolution is in line with the development of the Ukrainian banking system as 
specified in Section 3. In contrast, multimarket contacts weighted by the size of the rivals 
increased after 2014. The difference in the changes of contact measures can be explained by 
the difference in employed weighting factors. As stated above, the third weighting factor 
accounts for the mere size of the competitors. Since 2014, the numbers of banks and their 
branches have dropped significantly, resulting in the possibly increased market shares of the 
existing banks. This, in turn, might lead to an increase in the magnitude of the third multimarket 
contacts measure. 
<<Insert Fig 2 about here>> 
In 2014Q1, two pro-Russian regions in the Eastern Ukraine, Luhansk and Donetsk, self-
proclaimed themselves to be independent states and Crimea was also integrated into Russia. 
Corresponding to this conflict, the number of banks in those regions as well as some other 
regions decreased significantly (Panel D, Fig 2). Most of the affected regions are located in the 
Southeastern part of Ukraine and share borders with occupied regions. It is worth assessing the 
impact of multimarket competition on bank performance in relation with the political shock 
with reference to the shares in occupied and affected southeastern regions because the reduction 
in the number of banks and branches could lessen the competitiveness in the markets.  
5. Results and discussions 
5.1. Multimarket competition and bank profitability 
Table 3 reports the fixed-effect regression results regarding the competition at the regional level 
and the sample of multimarket banks. In columns (1)-(3), we use multimarket contacts weighted 
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by the similarity, the coincided markets ratio, and the rival’s size, respectively. We find that 
generally multimarket competition enhances bank profitability but the signs vary depending on 
the employed multipoint contact measures. The coefficients on the multimarket contacts 
weighted by the similarity and the coincided market ratios are significant and positive, but the 
coefficient on the multimarket contacts weighted by the size of the rivals is negative but 
insignificant. In particular, one standard deviation increase in multimarket contacts weighted 
by the similarity results in 1.73% increase in returns on assets while one standard deviation 
increase in multimarket contacts weighted by the overlapped markets ratio improves bank 
performance by 1.26%.   
<<Insert Table 3 about here>> 
Estimated results for the effects of multimarket competition at the city level are reported in 
Table 4. Columns (1)-(2) display results for competition in center cities, while columns (3) and 
(4) refer to the competition in cities with at least 50 branches and cities with at least 30 branches, 
respectively. For the sake of space, we only report regressions with significant coefficients on 
multimarket competition. We also acknowledge the positive association between multimarket 
competition at the city level and bank performance. Moreover, the coefficients of repeated 
contact are significant only if we control for the share similarity and overlapped markets ratio.  
This is consistent with previous findings. Particularly, multimarket banks repeatedly competing 
in center cities can improve their returns on assets by about 1.47-2% with one standard deviation 
increase in multipoint linkages. This effect is stronger than the effect at the regional level in 
both the magnitudes and the signs because the coefficients on multimarket competition at the 
regional level are only significant at the 10% significance level regardless of employed 
measures. Further, profits of multiple market banks can rise by 1.61% and 1.92% with one 
standard deviation increase in contacts if the banks compete in cities that have at least 30 
branches and 50 branches, respectively.  
<<Insert Table 4 about here>> 
Referring to the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia, we exclude all occupied regions 
(Crimea, Donetsk, and Lugansk) from our data and re-measure our multimarket competition.14 
Previous findings are confirmed when we acknowledge that the estimation results in Table 5 
are consistent with the results presented in Table 3 and Table 4. Generally, multipoint 
competition is positively associated with bank profitability. In addition, we observe stronger 
signs for this relationship at both regional and city levels when excluding the occupied regions 
from our sample. This suggests that the level of competition as well as the performance of the 
Ukrainian banking industry are somewhat affected by the political issues.  
<<Insert Table 5 about here>> 
                                                 
14 See Table A1 for descriptive statistics of multimarket competition indicators with reference to the exclusion.  
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When we measure the competition at the regional level, multimarket banks can improve their 
profits by 1.60-1.89% with one standard deviation increase in multimarket contacts. The 
positive impact of multimarket competition at city levels on bank performance is also observed. 
For example, banks can improve their profitability by 1.25-2.13% with one standard deviation 
increase in multiple market linkages. Similarly, the improvements are 1.29-2.05% and 2.27% 
regarding competition in cities with at least 50 branches and cities with at least 30 branches, 
respectively. Although the magnitudes of the competition at different market levels are 
quantitatively similar, the significant levels are quite different. The strength of the effect is 
weaker when we consider competition in center cities, cities with at least 50 branches and cities 
with at least 30 branches, respectively. Since the central locations as well as the number of 
banks and branches in the market indicate the competitive level of that market, this result 
suggests that banks can get more benefits from geographic overlaps in more competitive 
markets.  
Our results support the mutual forbearance hypothesis: banks can benefit from repeated 
competition. Consistent with other studies, we argue that the anti-competitive effect is 
facilitated by the information advantage. More specifically, repeated competition allows banks 
to collect relevant information about the rivals. This rises awareness about the competitive 
retaliation. Consequently, multipoint market banks should avoid vigorous competition and co-
operate instead. This effect is strengthened by the competitive level of the markets. When banks 
operate simultaneously in multiple markets with a high level of competitiveness, they have 
more incentives to mutual forbear. These results are in line with previous studies by Li and 
Chuang (2001), Scott (1991), and Whalen (1996) despite the differences in employed 
industries, multimarket contact measures and econometrics techniques. Moreover, the results 
for multimarket measure account for market share similarity in our study are consistent with Li 
and Greenwood (2004) regardless of different employed industries. Li and Greenwood (2004) 
account for the similarity in revenue collecting from overlapped markets when calculating 
multimarket linkages. They also find that the positive impact of multipoint contact on the 
performance of Canadian insurance companies increases with firm similarity.  
The use of different weighting factors in competition measure gives an insight into the channels 
through which multimarket contacts induce mutual forbearance incentives. The first channel is 
the similarity in terms of market shares. The argument is that banks pay more attention to the 
share-similar competitors because they have common interests and setups including targeted 
customers or services. Further, similarity leads to the increase of deterrence. That is, competing 
in multiple markets provides opportunities for banks to “hurt” rivals while having similar 
market shares implies symmetric ability to “hurt”. This result in increased deterrence that makes 
banks less prone to aggressive strategies. This provides evidence for the theoretical base 
proposed by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) and Edwards (1955). The second channel is the 
familiarity. More geographic overlaps increase the familiarity among multimarket banks and 
this makes multimarket competitors more salient. As a result, banks will avoid aggressive 
competition with the rivals which they are familiar with due to the anticipation of possible 
retaliation. This finding is in line with theoretical studies by Baum and Korn (1999) or 
Jayachandran et al. (1999). However, multimarket competition no longer has anti-competitive 
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effect when the mere size of the competitors is considered. If banks do not hold strong 
competitive positions, such as banks with small market share, they cannot benefit from their 
multimarket contacts. In other words, more powerful banks do not have incentives to refrain 
from aggressive attitudes towards relatively weaker counterparts (Teece et al., 1997). 
Regarding the impact of bank-specific variables on profitability, the deposit-to-assets ratio is 
positively and significantly related to returns on assets even though the coefficient is only 
significant at the 10% significance level. This suggests that the Ukrainian banks can transfer 
deposit liabilities into earnings. We also observe that bank size and loan-to-asset ratios have 
negative coefficients, while liquidity ratio and equity ratio have positive coefficients. However, 
those coefficients are insignificant regardless of employed samples. 
5.2. Multimarket competition–profitability relationship in the presence of exogenous 
shock 
The conflict between Ukraine and Russia has led to a huge reduction in in banks’ branch 
networks. However, some banks lost more branches than some others. Thus, we make use of 
the variation in banks’ exposure to the conflict in examining the anti-competitive effect of 
multimarket contacts using difference-in-differences approach. The regression results for the 
parallel trend test are presented in Panel A of Table 6. As expected, the coefficients on the 
treatment effect during the pre-conflict period are close to zero while the coefficients on the 
treatment effect after the conflict are negative. The pattern of these coefficients is showed in 
Fig 3. In general, we find robust evidence for the parallel trend. That is, before the conflict, the 
extent to which multimarket banks mutual forbear is not driven by the branch shares in the 
affected regions. Moreover, there is no evidence for the anticipatory branch adjustment of banks 
to prevent the exogenous shock. These estimates and pattern also suggest that the presence of 
banks in the affected regions before the conflict might have impact on the MMC-profitability 
relationship after the conflict. 
Since the parallel assumption is satisfied, we identify the sensitivity of multimarket 
competition–bank performance relationship in the presence of political dispute by estimating 
model (2). Regression results are presented in Panel B of Table 6. The coefficients on the 
interaction term between repeated competition and share of branches in affected regions are 
negative and significant. These results suggest that the share of branches in affected regions 
during the pre-conflict period weakens the effect of multipoint competition in the post-conflict 
period. More specifically, after 2014Q1, more affected banks, which had large branch networks 
in the affected regions before 2014Q1, no longer benefit from multimarket competition, 
compared to less affected counterparts that were less exposure to those markets.  This 
complements our previous finding that banks’ incentives to cooperate with their multipoint 
rivals are driven by the importance of the rivals and the competitiveness of the markets.  
<<Insert Table 6 about here>> 
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These results can be explained by two reasons. The first reason is due to the change in the 
competitiveness of the whole banking system. That is, the conflict hit the East and affected not 
only the occupied regions but also other regions, resulting in a significant decrease in the 
number of banks and branches. As a result, the competitiveness of the markets also decreases. 
Second, although the conflict influences the entire banking system, banks with more branches 
in the affected regions before 2014Q1 are more affected than others since they experience a 
sharper branch reduction or their banks were revoked. In other words, after the conflict, among 
the existing banks, more affected ones no longer have market share similarity with less affected 
counterparts and their competitive position is reduced substantially. Consequently, less affected 
banks may not want to mutual forbear with more affected opponents. 
5.3. Robustness of tests and results 
The robustness of previous results can be tested by a wide set of tests. First, we re-estimate 
model (1) with different samples. The fixed-effect regression results are presented in Table A2 
and Table A3. We observe consistent results for multimarket competition weighted by the 
market share similarity with positive and significant coefficients. Interestingly, regardless of 
samples of multimarket competition, we find negative and significant coefficients on 
multimarket competition weighted by the rival’s size when we include both multimarket and 
single-market banks in our regressions. This result strengthens our previous findings of the 
importance of geographic overlaps in profitability improvement. Further, it supports our 
argument that powerful banks tend not to co-operate with unimportant competitors. This may 
harm the performance of single-market banks and small multimarket banks.15 
Regarding competition in all regions, one standard deviation increase in multipoint contacts at 
regional level leads to an increase of 0.041% in profits for all banks and 0.048% increase in 
profits for domestic banks. Similarly, if multimarket contacts at center city level increase by 
one standard deviation, profits of all banks can be improved by 0.038% while domestic banks’ 
returns can be increased by 0.046%. For the sample of competition in unoccupied regions, we 
find similar results: positively significant coefficients on repeated contacts weighted by 
similarly and negatively significant coefficients on multimarket contacts weighted by the size 
of the rivals.  
Second, it is possible that the relationship between multipoint competition and profitability 
could be driven by the development of the overlapped markets. We check this possibility by 
constructing another multimarket contact measure weighted by the ratio of developed coincided 
markets to total coincided markets then re-estimate model (1) with this measure. We expect to 
find a stronger magnitude of the anti-competitive effect of this multimarket competition 
measure. The detailed measure is specified as follows: 
𝑤𝑗,𝑡
4
𝑖
=
𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡
 
                                                 
15 For the sake of space, we only report regressions with significant results. Full results are available upon request. 
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𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
4 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡𝑤𝑗,𝑡
4
𝑖𝑗≠𝑖
𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
where 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the number of financial and industrial developed regions in 
which bank i meets bank j.16 The estimation results are reported in Table A4. We find positive 
and significant coefficients on multimarket competition at both regional level and center city 
level regardless of employed samples. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the coefficients in these 
regressions are significantly higher than those in regressions with other competition measures. 
This suggests that repeated competition in more developed markets brings more benefits to 
banks than competing in less developed markets. 
Third, to test the robustness of the difference-in-differences estimation with continuous 
treatment, we employ the traditional difference-in-differences approach in which the treatment 
and control groups are divided by a binary variable. More specifically, we modify model (2) as 
follows: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡−1𝛿 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(4) 
where Treatment equals 1 if the share of branches in affected regions as of 2014Q1 is more than 
25%; 0 otherwise; Post equals 1 for the period after 2014Q1 and 0 otherwise.  
Before estimating model (4), we also test the assumption about parallel trend by estimating the 
mean difference between the two groups before the treatment (Panel A, Table A5). We observe 
that the difference is insignificant, suggesting the validity of parallel trend assumption. Panel B 
of Table A5 presents estimated results for model (4), and the results are consistent with the ones 
from difference-in-differences approach using continuous treatment. That is, after the conflict, 
less affected banks do not have incentives to co-operate with more affected banks. 
Fourth, it is possible that our results are subjected to the heterogeneity of some regions where 
banks operate their branches. More specifically, banks might benefit from the operation in other 
regions rather than the operation in Southeastern regions.17 If banks do not benefit from 
operating in Southeastern regions, classifying treatment and control groups by the share in 
affected Southeastern regions would not be appropriate. To rule out this possibility, we re-
estimate model (1) with reference to branches located in Southeastern regions only. The 
estimation results are presented in Panel C of Table A5. The coefficients on repeated 
competition in Southeastern regions are positive and significant at the 10% significance level. 
This suggests that in the absence of the external shock, banks can actually improve their 
profitability by operating and competing in the Southeastern part of Ukraine. 
                                                 
16 Financial and industrial developed regions include Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv city, Kyiv region, 
Lviv, Odesa, and Zaporizhzhia. 
17 Southeastern regions include Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and 
Zaporizhzhia. 
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6. Conclusion 
The effect of multimarket competition has been well documented in the literature with reference 
to different industries. Turning to the issue of multimarket competition in banking industry, 
there is an ongoing debate about whether banks can benefit from competing in multiple markets. 
However, studies examining the multiple market contacts – profitability relationship have been 
marginal - mainly due to the lack of relevant data and the problem of the identification strategy.  
In this paper, we address three issues. First, we document to what extent multimarket 
competition, indicated by multipoint linkages, affects banks’ financial performance. Second, 
we study the channels through which multimarket contacts can affect banks’ competitive 
strategies and thus performance. Third, we study the causal inference between multimarket 
competition and profitability in the presence of the exogenous shock. 
Using data of the Ukrainian banking sector from 2009Q1 to 2015Q4, we provide evidence for 
the mutual forbearance hypothesis. More specifically, multimarket contacts can improve bank 
profitability through anti-competitive effect. This effect is driven by (1) the increased 
deterrence among multimarket rivals caused by the similarity in market shares and (2) the 
increased familiarity led by the high number of overlapped markets. On the contrary, banks do 
not have incentives to cooperate with their smaller multipoint rivals. Our results are robust when 
we adopt different samples as well as redefine market at different geographical levels. We find 
stronger evidence for the positive relationship between multimarket contacts and financial 
performance if we exclude regions with Russia driven political unrest from our sample.  
Furthermore, we employ the difference-in-differences approach to track the changes in 
multimarket competition-profitability relationship as consequences of an unexpected shock to 
Ukrainian banks. In particular, we evaluate how Russia-caused political unrest in Eastern 
Ukraine affects competitive position of banks and the competitiveness of the markets. More 
specifically, we create the continuous treatment variable that equals the share of branches in the 
affected regions as of 2014Q1 to indicate the degree of which the banks are affected by the 
conflict. We expect that the higher degree of branch share in affected regions do not have 
significant effects on the positive association between multimarket competition and 
profitability before the conflict happened. Differently, after the conflict, the less affected banks 
no longer have incentives to cooperate with the more affected multimarket rivals and the effect 
of multimarket competition on performance has declined. Our regression results are consistent 
with those expectations. 
These results have important implications for the future changes in banking system structure. 
First, consolidation of small and medium banks should be promoted. Thus, consolidated banks 
can improve their competitiveness and gain benefits from anti-competition effect of 
multimarket contacts. Second, regulators could consider the mixture of geographical expansion 
and online service development. One the one hand, online services like internet banking or 
mobile bring convenience for customers in terms of finance access. On the other hand, the 
expanding branch networks to remote markets would benefit local customers having limited 
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access to online services. This also enhances the competitiveness of the markets that 
incentivizes multimarket banks to cooperate to get mutual benefits. 
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 Figure 1. Banks and branches distribution 
 
This figure displays the distribution of Ukrainian banks and branches across 27 regions. The white parts refer to occupied 
regions (Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk). The darker shading indicates relatively more banks/branches in the region. 
 Figure 2. Development of Ukrainian banking system over time (2009-2015) 
 
Panel A displays the growth of assets, loan and deposit from 2010 to 2015. Panel B displays the evolution of branches and 
banks in the Ukrainian banking system (2009Q1-2015Q4). The vertical axis on the right shows the range of number of 
branches. Panel C displays the decline in number of banks and number of branches in the post-conflict period (after 2014Q1) 
in most affected regions. These regions, along with three occupied regions (Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk), are top 10 most 
affected regions. Panel D displays the evolution of average multimarket contacts corresponding to different measures at 
regional level and center-city level (2009Q1-2015Q4). The vertical axis on the right shows the range of multimarket contact 
(MMC) weighted by the size of rivals. 
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 Figure 3. Effects of share in affected regions on MMC – performance sensitivity for 
quarters before, during and after the conflict 
 
This figure indicates the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of coefficients on the treatment effect in model (3). 
Estimates are taken from estimations with multimarket competition weighted by similarity and multimarket competition 
weighted by familiarity.
 Table 1. Descriptive statistics for sample of all regions, all banks. 
 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝐷 N 
 Multimarket competition at regional level 
MMC weighted by similarity  5.865 3.723 4,687 
MMC weighted by coincided markets ratio   4.517 2.711 4,687 
MMC weighted by rival’s size   0.063 0.047 4,687 
 Multimarket competition at center city level 
MMC weighted by similarity  5.494 3.607 4,687 
MMC weighted by coincided markets ratio   4.262 2.652 4,687 
MMC weighted by rival’s size   0.060 0.046 4,687 
 Bank profitability 
 ROA   -0.012 0.106 4,660 
 Bank-specific variables 
Size 14.225 1.584 4,684 
Liquidity 0.160 0.158 4,572 
Equity 0.243 0.191 4,593 
Loans/Total assets 0.649 0.271 4,682 
Deposits/Total assets 0.515 0.850 4,680 
Descriptive statistics for all banks in the sample of all regions. ROA is net profits over total assets; Size is natural logarithm 
of total assets; Equity is ratio of total equity over total assets; Liquidity is ratio of liquid assets over total assets; Deposits/Total 
assets is ratio of total deposits to total assets; Loans/Total assets is ratio of total loans to total assets. 
 Table 2. Descriptive statistics for sample of all regions, multimarket banks vs. single-
market banks. 
 Multimarket banks Single-market banks Difference 
 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑀 𝑆𝐷𝑀 𝑁𝑀 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑆 𝑆𝐷𝑆 𝑁𝑆 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑀
− 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑆 
 Regional level 
MMC weighted by similarity  6.573 3.453 4,092 - - - - 
MMC weighted by coincided 
markets ratio   
5.028 2.521 4,092 - - - - 
MMC weighted by rival’s size   0.071 0.045 4,092 - - - - 
ROA -0.014 0.112 4,076 0.002 0.042 584 -0.016*** 
Size 14.404 1.547 4,089 12.998 1.252 595 1.406*** 
Liquidity 0.152 0.145 3,997 0.220 0.220 575 -0.068*** 
Equity 0.218 0.161 4,001 0.409 0.275 592 -0.190*** 
Loan/Total assets 0.672 0.265 4,089 0.495 0.260 593 0.176*** 
Deposit/Total assets 0.534 0.902 4,089 0.383 0.260 591 0.151*** 
 Center city level 
MMC weighted by similarity  6.305 3.324 3,972 - - - - 
MMC weighted by coincided 
markets ratio   
4.849 2.457 3,972 - - - - 
MMC weighted by rival’s size   0.070 0.044 3,972 - - - - 
ROA -0.015 0.114 3,957 0.002 0.041 703 -0.016*** 
Size 14.446 1.540 3,969 13.002 1.224 715 1.444*** 
Liquidity 0.153 0.146 3,880 0.202 0.208 692 -0.049*** 
Equity 0.215 0.159 3,882 0.392 0.266 711 -0.177*** 
Loans/Total assets 0.672 0.268 3,969 0.521 0.252 713 0.151*** 
Deposits/Total assets 0.535 0.915 3,969 0.405 0.252 711 0.130*** 
Descriptive statistics for multimarket and single-market banks in the sample of all regions. Difference  
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑀 − 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑆 is mean differences and t-test significance. ROA is net profits over total assets; Size is natural logarithm of 
total assets; Equity is ratio of total equity over total assets; Liquidity is ratio of liquid assets over total assets; Deposits/Total 
assets is ratio of total deposits to total assets; Loans/Total assets is ratio of total loans to total assets. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 Table 3. Effect of multimarket competition at regional level on multimarket banks 
performance. 
             MMC1 
weighted by 
similarity 
MMC2 
weighted by coincided 
markets ratio 
MMC3 
weighted by rival’s size 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Multimarket competition    
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.172 
(0.197) 
Size         
-0.000 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
Liquidity    
0.044 
(0.037) 
0.044 
(0.037) 
0.0431 
(0.0367) 
Equity       
-0.042 
(0.044) 
-0.043 
(0.044) 
-0.046 
(0.043) 
Loans/Total assets 
0.018 
(0.027) 
0.019 
(0.027) 
0.018 
(0.027) 
Deposits/Total assets 
0.039* 
(0.023) 
0.039* 
(0.023) 
0.045** 
(0.023) 
Quarter and year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,876 3,876 3,876 
Adj. R-Square 0.054 0.054 0.054 
This table reports fixed-effect regressions for multimarket banks in the sample of all regions. The multimarket competition at 
regional level in columns (1)-(3) is indicated by multimarket contact in all regions weighted by size similarity, coincided 
markets ratio and rivals’ size, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include a 
constant term, but the estimated coefficients are not reported. ROA is net profits over total assets; Size is natural logarithm of 
total assets; Equity is ratio of total equity over total assets; Liquidity is ratio of liquid assets over total assets; Deposits/Total 
assets is ratio of total deposits to total assets; Loans/Total assets is ratio of total loans to total assets. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  
Table 4. Effect of multimarket competition at city levels on multimarket banks 
performance. 
 Center city level 
City level 
(≥50 branches) 
City level 
(≥30 branches) 
             
MMC1 
weighted by 
similarity 
MMC2 
weighted by 
coincided markets 
ratio 
 
MMC1 
weighted by 
similarity 
MMC1 
weighted by 
similarity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Multimarket competition    
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
Size         
-0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.000 
(0.012) 
-0.000 
(0.012) 
-0.000 
(0.012) 
Liquidity    
0.045 
(0.038) 
0.044 
(0.038) 
0.045 
(0.037) 
0.045 
(0.037) 
Equity       
-0.043 
(0.044) 
-0.044 
(0.044) 
-0.041 
(0.043) 
-0.042 
(0.043) 
Loans/Total assets 
0.017 
(0.027) 
0.017 
(0.027) 
0.018 
(0.027) 
0.018 
(0.027) 
Deposits/Total assets 
0.041* 
(0.023) 
0.042* 
(0.023) 
0.040* 
(0.023) 
0.040* 
(0.023) 
Quarter and year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,764 3,764 3,911 3,911 
Adj. R-Square 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.054 
This table reports fixed-effect regressions for multimarket banks in the sample of all regions. The multimarket competition in 
columns (1) and (2) is indicated by multimarket contact at center city level weighted by size similarity and coincided markets 
ratio, respectively. The multimarket competition in columns (3) and (4) is indicated by multimarket contact in cities having at 
least 50 branches and 30 branches which is weighted by size similarity, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. All regressions include a constant term, but the estimated coefficients are not reported. ROA is net profits over 
total assets; Size is natural logarithm of total assets; Equity is ratio of total equity over total assets; Liquidity is ratio of liquid 
assets over total assets; Deposits/Total assets is ratio of total deposits over total assets; Loans/Total assets is ratio of total loans 
to total assets. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 Table 5. Effect of multimarket competition in unoccupied regions on multimarket banks 
performance. 
 Regional level Center city level City level 
(≥50 branches) 
City level 
(≥30 
branches) 
 MMC1 
weighted 
by 
similarity 
MMC2 
weighted 
by 
coincided 
markets 
ratio 
MMC1 
weighted 
by 
similarity 
MMC2 
weighted 
by 
coincided 
markets 
ratio 
MMC1 
weighted 
by 
similarity 
MMC2 
weighted 
by 
coincided 
markets 
ratio 
MMC1 
weighted 
by 
similarity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Multimarket 
competition    
0.006** 
(0.003)    
0.007* 
(0.004)    
0.006** 
(0.003)    
0.007** 
(0.003)    
0.005** 
(0.003)    
0.005* 
(0.003)    
0.005* 
(0.003)    
   
Size         0.001 
(0.012)    
0.001 
(0.012)    
0.001 
(0.013)    
0.001 
(0.013)    
0.000 
(0.012)    
0.001 
(0.012)    
0.000 
(0.012)    
Liquidity    0.040 
(0.037)    
0.040 
(0.037)    
0.040 
(0.038)    
0.040 
(0.038)    
0.042 
(0.037)    
0.042 
(0.037)    
0.042 
(0.037)    
Equity       -0.040 
(0.045)    
-0.041 
(0.044)    
-0.040 
(0.046)    
-0.040 
(0.046)    
-0.040 
(0.045)    
-0.041 
(0.045)    
-0.040 
(0.045)    
Loans/Total 
assets 
0.013 
(0.028)    
0.013 
(0.028)    
0.011 
(0.028)    
0.011 
(0.028)    
0.013 
(0.028)    
0.013 
(0.027)    
0.013 
(0.028)    
Deposits/Total 
assets 
0.039* 
(0.023)    
0.039* 
(0.023)    
0.041* 
(0.023)    
0.041* 
(0.023)    
0.040* 
(0.023)    
0.041* 
(0.023)    
0.040* 
(0.023)    
Quarter and year 
fixed-effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group fixed-
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations     3,829          3,829          3,704          3,704            3,851          3,851            3,851    
Adj. R-Square     0.055        0.054        0.056         0.056          0.055        0.055          0.055    
This table reports fixed-effect regressions for sample of multimarket banks. The multimarket competition in columns (1)-(7) 
is indicated by multimarket contact in unoccupied regions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions 
include a constant term, but the estimated coefficients are not reported. ROA is net profits over total assets; Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets; Equity is ratio of total equity over total assets; Liquidity is ratio of liquid assets over total assets; 
Deposits/Total assets is ratio of total deposits over total assets; Loans/Total assets is ratio of total loans to total assets. *, ** 
and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 Table 6. Results for quasi-experimental approach. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: The parallel trend of treatment and control banks in pre-conflict period 
             MMC1 
weighted by similarity 
MMC2 
weighted by coincided 
markets ratio 
MMC3 
weighted by rival’s size 
Multimarket competition 0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.263 
(0.195) 
MMC*Share in affected 
regions leads and lags 
   
Conflictt-5 backward -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.012 
(0.084) 
Conflictt-4 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.094 
(0.102) 
Conflictt-3 -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.013 
(0.103) 
Conflictt-2 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.052 
(0.110) 
Conflictt-1 -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.075 
(0.125) 
Conflictt 0.000 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.012 
(0.179) 
Conflictt+1 0.004 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.392 
(0.291) 
Conflictt+2 -0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
-0.760 
(0.629) 
Conflictt+3 -0.021 
(0.018) 
-0.029 
(0.023) 
-1.330 
(1.597) 
Conflictt+4 -0.028** 
(0.013) 
-0.037** 
(0.016) 
-2.121* 
(1.075) 
Conflictt+5 -0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.367 
(0.301) 
Quarter and year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed-effect No No No 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,096 3,096 3,096 
Adj. R-Square 0.063 0.064 0.061 
Panel B: The effect of multimarket competition on profitability in relation with exogenous shock 
 MMC1 
weighted by similarity 
MMC2 
weighted by coincided 
markets ratio 
MMC3 
weighted by rival’s size 
Multimarket competition     0.020 
(0.013) 
0.021 
(0.015) 
0.267 
(0.964) 
MMC*Share in affected 
regions*Post 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
-0.019* 
(0.011) 
-1.220 
(0.779) 
Share in affected regions*Post -0.004 
(0.037) 
0.002 
(0.037) 
-0.012 
(0.037) 
Size         0.071* 
(0.041) 
0.072* 
(0.041) 
0.076* 
(0.040) 
Liquidity    -0.010 
(0.092) 
-0.014 
(0.091) 
-0.021 
(0.091) 
Equity       -0.105 
(0.167) 
-0.106 
(0.167) 
-0.108 
(0.167) 
Loans/Total assets -0.060 
(0.126) 
-0.059 
(0.125) 
-0.057 
(0.125) 
Deposits/Total assets 0.108 
(0.102) 
0.110 
(0.103) 
0.118 
(0.104) 
Quarter and year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed-effect No No No 
 Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,042 1,042 1,042 
Adj. R-Square 0.077 0.077 0.076 
Panel A reports fixed-effect regressions testing the parallel trend of the treatment and control banks during the pre-conflict 
period. Conflict dummies t-4 – t+4 equals1 in only one quarter per bank. Dummies Conflictt-5 backward and Conflict t+5 forward 
equal 1 in every quarter beginning with the fifth quarter before and the fifth quarter after the conflict, respectively. Panel B 
reports fixed-effect difference-in-differences regression with continuous treatment. Regression is estimated for multimarket 
domestic banks. All regressions include a constant term, but the estimated coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. ROA is net profits over total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of total assets; Equity is ratio of 
total equity over total assets; Liquidity is ratio of liquid assets over total assets; Deposits/Total assets is ratio of total deposits 
over total assets; Loans/Total assets is ratio of total loans to total assets. Share in the affected regions is the share of branches 
of a bank in the occupied regions and regions with pro-Russian protests (affected regions) as of 2014Q1. Post equals 1 for 
post-conflict period, 0 for pre-conflict period. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 Appendix 1. Variable description. 
Variable Description Expected 
sign 
Multimarket competition 
MMC weighted by 
similarity 
Multimarket contact measure weighted by similarity 
𝑠𝑖𝑘,𝑡 =
𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑘,𝑡
𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑘,𝑡
 
𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ |𝑠𝑖𝑘,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑗𝑘,𝑡|
𝑘
 
𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
1 =
𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑚i𝑗,𝑡
 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
1 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
1
𝑗≠𝑖
𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
+/- 
MMC weighted by 
coincided markets 
ratio 
Multimarket contact measure weighted by coincided 
markets ratio 
𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
2 =
𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
Where 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the total markets in which bank i 
operates at least one branch in quarter t. 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
2 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
2
𝑗≠𝑖
𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
+/- 
MMC weighted by 
rival’s size 
Multimarket contact measure weighted by rival’s size 
𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
3 =
∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑘,𝑡𝑘
𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡
 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
3 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗,𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑗≠𝑖
𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
+/- 
Bank-specific variables 
ROA Net profit over total assets  
Size Natural logarithm of total assets +/- 
Equity Total equity over total assets +/- 
Liquidity Ratio of liquid assets over total assets +/- 
Deposits/Total assets Total deposits over total assets +/- 
Loans/Total assets Ratio of total loans to total assets +/- 
 Appendix 2 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics for multimarket competition in different samples. 
 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝐷 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝐷 
Sample of all regions 
 Domestic banks 
 Regional level Center city level 
MMC weighted by similarity  5.334 3.508 4.979 3.414 
MMC weighted by coincided markets ratio   4.134 2.562 3.882 2.511 
MMC weighted by rival’s size   0.056 0.044 0.053 0.043 
 Multimarket banks 
 City level 
(≥30 branches) 
City level 
(≥50 branches) 
MMC weighted by similarity  7.759 5.379 7.353 4.818 
MMC weighted by coincided markets ratio   4.965 2.975 5.035 2.990 
MMC weighted by rival’s size   0.123 0.121 0.102 0.086 
Sample of unoccupied regions 
 All banks 
 Regional level Center city level 
MMC weighted by similarity  5.436 3.405 5.127 3.320 
MMC weighted by coincided markets ratio   4.186 2.466 3.987 2.438 
MMC weighted by rival’s size   0.059 0.044 0.056 0.043 
 Domestic banks 
 Regional level Center city level 
MMC weighted by similarity  4.944 3.198 4.650 3.140 
MMC weighted by coincided markets ratio   3.833 2.323 3.636 2.305 
MMC weighted by rival’s size   0.052 0.040 0.049 0.040 
 Multimarket banks 
 Regional level Center city level 
MMC weighted by similarity  6.100 3.152 5.907 3.045 
MMC weighted by coincided markets ratio   4.662 2.291 4.550 2.250 
MMC weighted by rival’s size   0.066 0.042 0.065 0.041 
 Multimarket banks 
 City level 
(≥30 branches) 
City level 
(≥50 branches) 
MMC weighted by similarity  6.940 4.532 6.609 4.091 
MMC weighted by coincided markets ratio   4.534 2.561 4.596 2.577 
MMC weighted by rival’s size   0.105 0.097 0.088 0.070 
Descriptive statistics for multimarket contacts corresponding to different samples. 
 Table A2. Robustness check – sample of all banks. 
 All banks Domestic banks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
             MMC1 
weighted by similarity 
MMC3 
weighted by rival’s size 
MMC1 
weighted by similarity 
Panel A. Regional level 
Multimarket competition    
0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.358* 
(0.194) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
Size         0.003 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.016) 
Liquidity    0.035 
(0.027) 
0.036 
(0.027) 
0.026 
(0.029) 
Equity       -0.036 
(0.035) 
-0.037 
(0.035) 
-0.056 
(0.040) 
Loans/Total assets 0.022 
(0.023) 
0.021 
(0.023) 
0.008 
(0.028) 
Deposits/Total assets 0.032* 
(0.018) 
0.040** 
(0.018) 
0.028 
(0.020) 
Quarter and year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed-effect Yes Yes No 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,430 4,430 3,710 
Adj. R-Square 0.046 0.047 0.046 
Panel B. Center city level 
Multimarket competition    
0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.369* 
(0.197) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
Size         0.003 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.016) 
Liquidity    0.035 
(0.027) 
0.036 
(0.027) 
0.026 
(0.029) 
Equity       -0.036 
(0.035) 
-0.038 
(0.035) 
-0.056 
(0.040) 
Loans/Total assets 0.022 
(0.023) 
0.021 
(0.023) 
0.008 
(0.028) 
Deposits/Total assets 0.033* 
(0.018) 
0.040** 
(0.018) 
0.028 
(0.020) 
Quarter and year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed-effect Yes Yes No 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,430 4,430 3,710 
Adj. R-Square 0.046 0.047 0.046 
This table reports fixed-effect regressions for the sample of all banks. Panels A and B report regressions for multimarket 
competition at regional and center city levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions 
include a constant term, but the estimated coefficients are not reported. ROA is net profit over total assets; Size is natural 
logarithm of total assets; Equity is ratio of total equity over total assets; Liquidity is ratio of liquid assets over total assets; 
Deposits/Total assets is ratio of total deposits over total assets; Loans/Total assets is ratio of total loans to total assets. *, ** 
and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 Table A3. Robustness check – sample of domestic banks. 
 All banks Domestic banks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
             MMC1 
weighted by similarity 
MMC3 
weighted by rival’s size 
MMC1 
weighted by similarity 
Panel A. Regional level 
Multimarket competition    0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.369* 
(0.202) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
Size         0.003 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.017) 
Liquidity    0.035 
(0.027) 
0.036 
(0.027) 
0.027 
(0.029) 
Equity       -0.038 
(0.036) 
-0.041 
(0.036) 
-0.058 
(0.042) 
Loans/Total assets 0.022 
(0.024) 
0.021 
(0.023) 
0.009 
(0.028) 
Deposits/Total assets 0.033* 
(0.019) 
0.039** 
(0.019) 
0.028 
(0.021) 
Quarter and year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed-effect Yes Yes No 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,390 4,390 3,670 
Adj. R-Square 0.046 0.047 0.046 
Panel B. Center city level 
Multimarket competition    0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.385* 
(0.204) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
Size         0.003 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.017) 
Liquidity    0.035 
(0.027) 
0.036 
(0.027) 
0.026 
(0.029) 
Equity       -0.038 
(0.036) 
-0.041 
(0.036) 
-0.059 
(0.042) 
Loans/Total assets 0.022 
(0.024) 
0.021 
(0.023) 
0.009 
(0.028) 
Deposits/Total assets 0.033* 
(0.019) 
0.039** 
(0.019) 
0.028 
(0.021) 
Quarter and year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed-effect Yes Yes No 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,390 4,390 3,670 
Adj. R-Square 0.046 0.047 0.046 
This table reports fixed-effect regressions for the sample of domestic banks. Panels A and B report regressions for multimarket 
competition at regional and center city levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions 
include a constant term, but the estimated coefficients are not reported. ROA is net profit over total assets; Size is natural 
logarithm of total assets; Equity is ratio of total equity over total assets; Liquidity is ratio of liquid assets over total assets; 
Deposits/Total assets is ratio of total deposits over total assets; Loans/Total assets is ratio of total loans to total assets. *, ** 
and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
 Table A4. Robustness check – different weighting factor. 
 Panel A. Sample of all regions 
             Regional level Center city level City level 
(≥50 branches) 
City level 
(≥30 branches) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Multimarket competition weighted by ratio 
of developed markets 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.009** 
(0.005) 
0.009* 
(0.004) 
Size         -0.000 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
Liquidity    0.045 
(0.037) 
0.035 
(0.027) 
0.046 
(0.036) 
0.046 
(0.036) 
Equity       -0.042 
(0.044) 
-0.035 
(0.035) 
-0.042 
(0.043) 
-0.042 
(0.043) 
Loans/Total assets 0.016 
(0.027) 
0.021 
(0.024) 
0.017 
(0.027) 
0.018 
(0.027) 
Deposits/Total assets 0.041* 
(0.022) 
0.033* 
(0.018) 
0.040* 
(0.022) 
0.040* 
(0.023) 
Quarter and year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,876 3,764 3,911 3,911 
Adj. R-Square 0.055 0.056 0.055 0.055 
 Panel B. Sample of unoccupied regions 
             Regional level Center city level City level 
(≥50 branches) 
City level 
(≥30 branches) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Multimarket competition weighted by ratio 
of developed markets 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.014** 
(0.007) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
Size         0.000 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.000 
(0.012) 
-0.000 
(0.012) 
Liquidity    0.040 
(0.037) 
0.040 
(0.038) 
0.043 
(0.037) 
0.043 
(0.037) 
Equity       -0.041 
(0.045) 
-0.040 
(0.046) 
-0.040 
(0.045) 
-0.040 
(0.045) 
Loans/Total assets 0.011 
(0.028) 
0.010 
(0.028) 
0.013 
(0.028) 
0.013 
(0.028) 
Deposits/Total assets 0.040* 
(0.022) 
0.042* 
(0.023) 
0.040* 
(0.023) 
0.040* 
(0.023) 
Quarter and year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,829 3,704 3,851 3,851 
Adj. R-Square 0.055 0.056 0.055 0.055 
This table reports fixed-effect regressions for the sample of multimarket banks. Multimarket competition in weighted by the 
ratio of developed markets. Panels A and B report multimarket contact in all regions and in unoccupied regions, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term, but the estimated coefficients are 
not reported. ROA is net profits over total assets; Size is natural logarithm of total assets; Equity is ratio of total equity over 
total assets; Liquidity is ratio of liquid assets over total assets; Deposits/Total assets is ratio of total deposits over total assets; 
Loans/Total assets is ratio of total loans to total assets. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 Table A5. Robustness check for difference-in-differences approach 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Parallel trend test of the dependent variable for the pre-treatment period 
 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 Difference 
ROA   -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 
Panel B. Difference-in-differences estimation with binary treatment 
 MMC1 
weighted by similarity 
MMC2 
weighted by coincided 
markets ratio 
MMC3 
weighted by rival’s size 
Multimarket competition     0.016 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.014) 
-0.116 
(0.967) 
MMC*Treatment*Post -0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.556** 
(0.264) 
Size         0.075* 
(0.042) 
0.076* 
(0.042) 
0.081* 
(0.041) 
Liquidity    -0.015 
(0.092) 
-0.018 
(0.091) 
-0.025 
(0.090) 
Equity       -0.092 
(0.164) 
-0.094 
(0.164) 
-0.090 
(0.164) 
Loans/Total assets -0.066 
(0.125) 
-0.064 
(0.124) 
-0.063 
(0.124) 
Deposits/Total assets 0.118 
(0.104) 
0.119 
(0.104) 
0.129 
(0.105) 
Quarter and year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed-effect No No No 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,042 1,042 1,042 
Adj. R-Square 0.078 0.078 0.078 
Panel C: The effect of multimarket competition in south-eastern regions on bank performance 
             MMC1 
weighted by similarity 
MMC2 
weighted by coincided 
markets ratio 
MMC3 
weighted by rival’s size 
Multimarket competition 0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.013* 
(0.008) 
-0.498 
(0.513) 
Size         -0.000 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
Liquidity    0.044 
(0.037) 
0.061 
(0.051) 
0.057 
(0.044) 
Equity       -0.042 
(0.044) 
-0.016 
(0.043) 
-0.021 
(0.041) 
Loans/Total assets 0.018 
(0.027) 
0.008 
(0.034) 
0.020 
(0.033) 
Deposits/Total assets 0.039* 
(0.023) 
0.057** 
(0.025) 
0.055** 
(0.022) 
Quarter and year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Group fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,876 3,204 3,672 
Adj. R-Square 0.054 0.065 0.056 
Panel A reports the test of mean differences of banks’ characteristics between control and treatment groups. Panel B reports 
fixed-effect difference-in-differences regression using traditional binary treatment. Regression is estimated for multimarket 
domestic banks. Panel C reports fixed-effect regression for multimarket banks with reference to multimarket competition in 
Southeastern regions. All regressions include a constant term, but the estimated coefficients are not reported. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ROA is net profits over total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of total assets; Equity is 
ratio of total equity over total assets; Liquidity is ratio of liquid assets over total assets; Deposits/Total assets is ratio of total 
deposits over total assets; Loans/Total assets is ratio of total loans to total assets. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively.
 Appendix 3 
Assume that there are 4 banks which operate in 3 markets A, B and C. Each bank has the 
number of branches in each market as follows: 
 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 
Market A 1 0 4 5 
Market B 2 2 0 4 
Market C 3 3 0 6 
We have market share of each bank in each market as follows: 
 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 
Market A 𝑠1𝐴 = 0.1 𝑠2𝐴 = 0 𝑠3𝐴 = 0.4 𝑠4𝐴 = 0.5 
Market B 𝑠1𝐵 = 0.25 𝑠2𝐵 = 0.25 𝑠3𝐵 = 0 𝑠4𝐵 = 0.5 
Market C 𝑠1𝐴 = 0.25 𝑠2𝐶 = 0.25 𝑠3𝐶 = 0 𝑠4𝐶 = 0.5 
MMC1 calculation for bank 1: 
𝑆𝐼12 = |0.25 − 0.25| + |0.25 − 0.25| = 0 ⟹ 𝑤112 =
(2 − 0)
2⁄ = 1 
𝑆𝐼13 = |0.1 − 0.4| = 0.3 ⟹ 𝑤112 =
(1 − 0.3)
1⁄ = 0.7 
𝑆𝐼14 = |0.1 − 0.5| + |0.25 − 0.5| + |0.25 − 0.5| = 0.9 ⟹ 𝑤112 =
(3 − 0.9)
3⁄ = 0.7 
𝑀𝑀𝐶1 =
2×1 + 1×0.7 + 3×0.7
3
= 1.6 
MMC2 calculation for bank 1: 
𝑤212 =
2
3⁄ = 0.667 
𝑤213 =
1
3⁄ = 0.333 
𝑤214 =
3
3⁄ = 1 
𝑀𝑀𝐶2 =
2×0.667 + 1×0.333 + 3×1
3
= 1.556 
MMC3 calculation for bank 1: 
𝑤312 =
(0.25 + 0.25)
2⁄ = 0.25 
𝑤313 =
0.4
1⁄ = 0.4 
𝑤314 =
(0.5 + 0.5 + 0.5)
3⁄ = 0.5 
𝑀𝑀𝐶3 =
2×0.25 + 1×0.4 + 3×0.5
3
= 0.8
 
